主题 Topic: Rent-seeking Paradox and the China Miracle
时间Time：12月25号（周五）｜ December 25th (Friday), 3:15 – 4:30 PM
地点Venue：文波楼204室｜Room 204 , WENBO
主讲人Speaker：Jack W. Hou
Jack W. Hou, 加利福尼亚州立大学经济学教授，西南财经大学经济学院特聘教授，河南大学特聘教授，在国际内外期刊上发表50余篇中英文论文，如: Economic Journal, China Economic Review, Singapore Economic Review, Soochow Journal of Economics and Business, Applied Economics, The Social Science Journal, International Journal of Business and Economics, The Indian Journal of Labour Economics, International Journal of Applied Economics, Social Science Journal 等。
研究领域: 劳动经济学，国际经济学，中国经济
Jack W. Hou, Professor of California State University; Distinguished Professor of School of Economics, Southwestern University of Finance and Economic, Scholar of the Yellow River Distinguished Professor. Over 50 academic papers have been published in international journals including Economic Journal, China Economic Review, Singapore Economic Review, Soochow Journal of Economics and Business, Applied Economics, The Social Science Journal, International Journal of Business and Economics, The Indian Journal of Labour Economics, International Journal of Applied Economics, Social Science Journal, etc.
Research Interest: Labor Economics, International Economics, Chinese Economy
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the the economical success of China. By comparing the economic growth paths of China and Russian, the paper proposes that the fundamental driving force in the economic development in China is the rent-seeking mechanism.
Based on the traditional theory, when scarce resources are used on directly unproductive profit-seeking activities (DUP), economic growth will be reduced, for developing and transitional economies, the rent-seeking is even more detrimental. However, in modern China, as the entrenchment of rent-seeking incentives is at least as strong as before, China is experiencing a growth miracle that is unparalleled in modern history.
Moreover, in contrast to the “shock” treatment of Russia, the key that make differences between the two countries is perhaps the gradualism of China’s reform. Given the imperfect market mechanism, this is perhaps a natural second-best option. The paper discusses this issue in the perspective of economic institutionalism, and socio-political analysis.
In addition, the paper states that there is a symbiotic relationship of the rent seeking and market mechanisms in transition China.
At last, the author indicated that as the economic gains diminish, and the acceleration of social and political costs of the rent-seeking activities over the past 30+ years, the “reform dividend” inevitably diminishes.
