主题 Topic：Power Struggle and Government Oversizing: Unintended Consequences of Checks and Balances in a One-party Regime
时间Time：3月4号（周五）｜ March 4th (Friday), 9:30 – 11:30 am
地点Venue：文波楼208室｜Room 208 , WENBO
主讲人Speaker：梁平汉，西南财经大学经济与管理研究院副教授。2010年获西班牙巴塞罗那自治大学经济学博士学位，2014-2015年于美国西北大学凯洛格商学院访问，数十篇中英文论文发表在：Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (SSCI), Review of Development Economics (SSCI), Journal of Comparative Economics (SSCI) Games and Economic Behavior (SSCI), Pacific Economic Review (SSCI), 经济研究（CSSCI）, 管理世界（CSSCI）,世界经济（CSSCI） 等中英文国际学术期刊上。
研究领域:
博弈论，政治经济学，实验经济学
Dr. Pinghan Liang is an associate professor of economics at Research Institute of Economics and Management at SWUFE. Professor Liang received his Ph.D. degree from Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona in 2010, and was invited as a visiting scholar in Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, U.S.A. during 2014 and 2015. He has published academic papers in several Journals like Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (SSCI), Review of Development Economics (SSCI), Journal of Comparative Economics (SSCI) Games and Economic Behavior (SSCI), Pacific Economic Review (SSCI), Economic Research Journal(CSSCI), Management World(CSSCI), The Journal of World Economy(CSSCI),etc.
Research Area:
Game Theory, Political Economy, Experimental Economics
Abstract:
This paper argues that under weak executive constraints, the need to preserve power balance among elites might cause inefficient targeted redistribution towards bureaucratic interest groups. We develop a simple model to study the role of political power/influence in the bargaining among leading local politicians in a one party regime, and use this to explain the rapid growing sub-national government staff in China, in spite of the repeated streamlining programs initiated by the central government. By employing a provincial-level panel data in China during 1992-2011, we show that the sub-national government headed by a political weaker party secretary is significantly associated with the increasing number of senior cadres, as well as larger public employment. However, the secretary’s personal influence defined as the political connections with the central government significantly mitigates the effect of his weakness. Further, larger personal influence is not associated with more fiscal transfer from the center or better career prospect for local politicians, indicating that power/influence serves as “stick” to discipline the colleagues, instead of “carrot” in decision-making process. These results are robust against a variety of specifications and estimation strategies. We also show that the local government might overcome the financial constraint on staff expansion by selling more land.
