主题 Topic：Optimal Segmentation of Competitive Search Markets
时间Time：3月18号（周五）｜ March 18th (Friday), 10:00 – 11:30 am
地点Venue：文波楼208室｜Room 208 , WENBO
主讲人Speaker：蔡晓鸣，同济大学经济与金融系助理教授，2015年获荷兰丁伯根研究所(Tinbergen Institute)经济学博士学位。他的论文已发表于Economica (SSCI) 和Labor Economics (SSCI) 等世界知名经济期刊上。本周讲座的文章已投稿知名经济期刊Journal of Economic Theory (SSCI) 并获得主编邀请进行修改(revise and resubmit)。
研究领域:
宏观经济学，劳动经济学，应用微观经济学，经济增长
Dr. Xiaoming Cai is an assistant professor of Department of Economics and Finance, Tongji University. Dr. Cai earns his PhD degree in Economics at Tinbergen Institute, VU University Amsterdam, Netherlands, in 2015. He has published academic papers in Economica (SSCI)and Labour Economics (SSCI). The topic he will present this week is now under revise and will be resubmitted to Journal of Economic Theory (SSCI).
Research Area:
Macroeconomics, Labor Economics, Applied Microeconomics, Growth
Abstract:
In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are bilateral. In contrast, a single market in which all buyers pool is optimal if and only if the meeting technology satisfies a novel condition, which we call “joint concavity.” Both outcomes can be decentralized by sellers posting auctions combined with a fee that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller meets. Finally, we compare joint concavity to two other properties of meeting technologies, invariance and non-rivalry, and explain the differences.
