主题 Topic：博弈理论与产业组织专题系列讲座
时间Time：4月8号（周五）｜ April 8st (Friday), 8:40-12:10AM, 2:00-5:30PM
地点Venue：文澜楼405会议室|Conference Room 405, Wenlan Building
主讲人Speakers:
1.Biung-Ghi Ju, 韩国首尔大学经济学院教授，首尔大学分配中心主任，Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics杂志Editor。主要研究领域为博弈理论，经济理论，社会选择理论等。论文多篇发表在SSCI期刊上，如Journal of Economic Theory，Economic Theory，International Journal of Game Theory 等。
As the professor of Seoul National University, the Director of Center for Distributive Justice, Seoul National University and the editor for Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, professor Biung-Ghi Ju has published many papers in SSCI Journals like Journal of Economic Theory，Economic Theory and International Journal of Game Theory, etc.
Title: Inclusive Collusion Neutrality on Networks
Abstract: In the context of cooperative games with transferable utility, an inclusive collusion grants each colluding player access to resources of all colluding players and therefore transforms a given game. Inclusive collusion neutrality requires that no group of players can change their total payoff with an inclusive collusion. Assuming that collusion formation is governed by a network defined over players, we show that if the network is cyclic, no solution satisfies inclusive collusion neutrality, efficiency, and the null-player property. Tree (acyclic) networks allow us to escape the impossibility: affine combinations of the hierarchical solutions satisfy the three axioms. Further, we establish that the latter family of solutions are characterized by the three axioms and linearity.
2.李杰，暨南大学教授，博士生导师。主要研究产业组织理论，国际贸易和中国经济。多篇论文发表在SSCI期刊上，如Review of Development Economics，The World Economy，The Journal of International Trade and Economic Development，Pacific Economic Review，China Economic Review等。
Jie Li is the Professor of Jinan University. His research interests are Industrial Organization, International Trade and China Economy. Many of his papers are published in SSCI Journals such as Review of Development Economics，The World Economy，The Journal of International Trade and Economic Development，Pacific Economic Review，China Economic Review, etc.
Title: Lobbying to Raise Rivals' Costs: The Case of Environmental Regulations
Abstract: We consider the case where clean firms, motivated to “raise rivals’ costs,” lobby to increase the stringency of an environmental regulation (we consider a pollution tax and a mandatory emission standard), whereas their dirty rivals lobby against it. We demonstrate that such a lobbying competition generates a bias against clean firms: only sufficiently large clean firms can succeed in persuading the policymaker to strengthen the regulation, whereas relatively smaller dirty firms can succeed in weakening the regulation. Our findings predict that in markets dominated by dirty firms, as a result of firms’ lobbying competition, regulations can “race to the bottom.”
3.Toshihiro Matsumura, 东京大学社会科学院教授。主要研究领域为产业组织学，公共经济，区域科学，法律与经济。发表多篇SSCI论文，如Journal of Public Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Economics，Southern Economic Journal，Review of Development Economics，Regional Science and Urban Economics，International Journal of Industrial Organization，Economics Letters，等。
Professor Toshihiro Matsumura, the professor at Institute of Social Science, the University of Tokyo, the associate editor of Journal of Economics, and the Co-editor of Law and Economics Review, is conducting researches on Industrial Organization, Public Economics, Regional Science, Law and Economics. You will find his papers in SSCI Journals like Journal of Public Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Economics，Southern Economic Journal，Review of Development Economics，Regional Science and Urban Economics，International Journal of Industrial Organization，Economics Letters, etc.
Title: Payoff Interdependence and Multi-Store Paradox
Abstract: We solve the multi-store paradox by introducing interdependent payoff between the firms. We show that firms set up multiple stores unless the degree of payoff interdependence is low. We also show that multiple equilibria, intertwined and neighboring location equilibria, exist if the degree of payoff interdependence is intermediate.
4.叶光亮，中国人民大学教授、博士生导师，反垄断与竞争政策研究所（ACPC）所长。毕业于美国威斯康星大学密尔沃基分校，获经济学博士学位。之前曾任教于中山大学、西南财经大学；入选教育部新世纪优秀人才计划、中山大学、西南财经大学优秀教师；主持国家自然科学基金、霍英东教育基金、教育部人文社会科学基金等项目。主要研究方向为应用微观经济学、产业组织理论、规制与反垄断、混合寡头垄断等，在Organization Science， Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization，International Journal of Industrial Organization，Economic Inquiry，Regional Science and Urban Economics，Journal of Comparative Economics，Economics Letters等杂志发表学术论文；现任人大复印报刊资料《产业经济》执行编委。
Guangliang Ye, the Professor and Chair of Hanqing Advanced Institute of Economics and Finance, Renmin University of China, the director of Antitrust and Competition Policy Center, is mainly conduct researches in Industrial Organization, Mixed Oligopoly, Regulation and Antitrust, Applied Game Theory and Strategy. The majority of his papers are published in SSCI magazines: Organization Science， Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization，International Journal of Industrial Organization，Economic Inquiry，Regional Science and Urban Economics，Journal of Comparative Economics，Economics Letters, etc.
Title: Partial Acquisition with an Excluded Public Rival
Abstract: This paper considers a canonical differential product pricing model and examines partial acquisition in the face of a public outside firm. We show that when the acquiring firm is a domestic firm, the partial acquisition will always take place even with any institutional threshold requirement for pricing control. We contrast this result with that when the outsider is a private firm. When the acquiring firm is a foreign firm, the partial acquisition will not take place in the face of public outsider with a sufficiently high threshold requirement. In this case the setting of a threshold together with the presence of public firm increases domestic welfare and can even increase social welfare by forestalling an inefficient partial acquisition.
5.韩天德，英国拉夫堡大学经济学博士生，研究方向为环境经济学、垂直结构与产业组织等。本次讲座文章与诺丁汉大学Arijit Mukherjee教授合作，已投递至SSCI期刊Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 并处于第二轮审阅中。
Dr. Tien-Der Han is Currently study in Loughborough University. His research interests are Environmental Economics, Vertical Structure and Industrial Organization. Cooperated with Professor Arijit Mukherjee (The University of Nottingham), the paper “Labour Unionisation Structure, innovation and welfare” is under the second round review by Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (SSCI).
Title: Labour Unionisation Structure, innovation and welfare
Abstract: We show the effects of cooperation among the labour unions with complementary workers on innovation, consumer surplus and welfare. Although cooperation among the unions reduces wage, it may either increase or decrease the firm’s incentive for innovation and may also make the consumers and the society worse off by reducing innovation. While cooperation (compared to non-cooperation) among the unions makes the workers better off, it may not make all final goods producers better off.
6.Rupayan Pal，甘地英迪拉发展研究所（IGIDR）经济学副教授，专注于应用微观经济学，应用计量经济学，产业组织学，公共经济，环境经济学，劳工经济学，经济&政策，金融&发展与区域贸易等领域的研究。多篇论文发表在Resource and Energy Economics, International Journal of Economic Theory，Regional Science and Urban Economics 等SSCI期刊上。
Rupayan Pal is the associate professor of Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR). His main researches are Applied Microeconomic Theory, Econometric Applications, Industrial Organisation, Public Economics, Environmental Economics, Labour
Economics, Economics & Politics, Finance & Development and International Trade. Many of his papers are published in SSCI publications: Resource and Energy Economics, International Journal of Economic Theory，Regional Science and Urban Economics, etc.
Title: Probabilistic Patents, Alternative Damage Rules and Optimal Trade Policy
Abstract: This paper attempts to explore interdependencies between optimal trade policy and ‘preferred’ liability doctrine to assess infringement damages, when intellectual property rights are probabilistic. Developing a model of import competition in which the patentee is a foreign firm and the potential competitor/infringer is a domestic firm, it demonstrates the following. In the regime of free trade, the patentee prefers the ‘lost profit’ rule, while the infringer prefers the ‘unjust enrichment’ rule, over any convex combination of these two liability doctrines. Further, given the choice, the government of the home country would always enforce the ‘unjust enrichment’ rule to be followed in the court of law, which is aligned with the interest of consumers. In contrast, in the regime of trade policy intervention, the government of the home country always prefers the ‘lost profit’ rule, which best protects interests of the infringer at the expense of both consumers and the patentee. It also shows that optimal trade policy depends, not only on the strength of the patent, but also on the liability doctrine in place. If the patent is strong, it is optimal for the importing country to impose a tariff on imports under ‘lost profit’ rule, but import subsidization is optimal under ‘unjust enrichment’ rule. If the patent is weak, imposition of import tariff is optimal regardless of the liability doctrine, but ‘lost profit’ rule calls for a higher rate of import tariff than that under ‘unjust enrichment’ rule.
7.董保民,河南大学经济学院经济学教授，研究方向为产业组织理论、经济史、国际经济、环境与资源经济学、博弈论及其应用等。多篇论文发表于Review of Development Economics, The World Economy, Economic Modelling，Emerging Markets Finance and Trade，Review of Public Economics等SSCI期刊上
Baomin Dong, the professor of Henan University. His research interests are Industrial Organization, Economic History, International Trade, Environmental and Resource Economics, Game Theory and the Application. Has published papers in SSCI Magazines: Review of Development Economics, The World Economy, Economic Modelling，Emerging Markets Finance and Trade，Review of Public Economics, etc.
Title: A Signalling Model of Loss Leader Pricing Strategy
Abstract: The traditional theory of loss leader pricing strategy suffers from ad hoc assumptions such as high consumer search cost, product complementarity, and short-sighted consumer rationality. We argue that with the rise of internet consumer search cost is extremely reduced, and in many realistic situations, loss leader goods have no obvious complements. It is shown in both monopoly and oligopoly settings that firms may use loss leader pricing strategy to signal the quality of its advance goods, which is only known to some informed consumers if otherwise. Therefore, loss leader pricing strategy is socially desirable because the lemon problem disappears. Our model is robust to consumers’ cherry-picking and deliberate stockoutage problems.
8.杨雅博，高雄大学经营管理研究所教授, 研究方向：国际经济，产业经济,环境经济,区域科学,都市经济等。已在SSCI期刊，如Journal of Economics，International Review of Economics and Finance，Review of International Economics 等发表文章。
Ya-Po Yang, Professor of Institute of Business and Management in University of Kaohsiung. His research interests are: International Economics, Industrial Economics, Environmental Economics, Regional Science and Urban Economics. His papers are published in SSCI Journals like: Journal of Economics，International Review of Economics and Finance，Review of International Economics, etc.
Title: Corporate Social Responsibility, Trade and Environmental Policy
Abstract: In this paper, we investigate in the “third market” trade model what’s the optimal export policy when exporting firms takes CSR behavior? Who will benefit and who will suffer? What’s welfare ranking of no, unilateral and bilateral export policy? The main findings are that 1. If the domestic government adopt export policy, the domestic firm may benefit more from taking more CSR; 2. Export policy makes the CSR behavior of firms neutral, no matter the export policy is unilateral of bilateral and no matter the two firms engage in Counot or Bertrand competition; 3. When the two firms engaged in Cournot competition and don’t take CSR, and if the two exporting goods are more differentiated, bilateral export policy is better than the other two scenarios for all of the three countries, while when they take CSR, it is less possible to happen; 4. When the two firms engaged in Bertrand competition and don’t take CSR, and if the two exporting goods are more differentiated, no policy is better than the other two scenarios for the two exporting nations; and when firms take CSR, no policy is better and more probable.
9.帅杰, 中南财经政法大学副教授，于2009年毕业于美国俄亥拉荷马大学，获经济学博士。主要研究领域为产业组织，微观经济学，博弈论。已在International Journal of Industrial Organization（SSCI）发表文章，目前有多篇文章被国际权威学术期刊如The Manchester School（SSCI），The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy（SSCI），Journal of Economic（SSCI）接受。
Jie Shuai, the associate professor of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, is graduated from the University of Oklahoma in 2009. His main research interests are Industrial Organization, Public Economics and Game Theory. He has published papers in SSCI Journals like International Journal of Industrial Organization. And more of his papers has been accepted by SSCI Journals like The Manchester School，The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy，Journal of Economic, etc.
Title: Behavior-Based Price Discrimination in a Multi-Dimensional Preferences Market
Abstract: This article is a first look at the profit and welfare effects of behavior-based price discrimination in a two-period multi-dimensional preferences model. Compared to one-dimensional models, we show that firms compete less aggressively in both periods and so new results are obtained. Specifically, under forward looking consumers and two symmetric dimensions, BBPD boosts industry profits at the expense of consumers. However, we show that the standard one-dimensional welfare results can prevail under asymmetric dimensions and myopic consumers.
