主题Topic：A Tale of TwoLemons: Multi-good Dynamic Adverse Selection
时间Time：10月28号（周五）｜October28, 2016 (Friday), 14:00–15:35
地点Venue：文波207｜Room207, WENBO
主讲人Speaker：
皇甫秉超老师，美国罗切斯特大学经济学博士。主研微观经济学、机制设计，产业组织、博弈论等方向。已在Journal of Financial Research 发表文章。
研究领域:
微观经济学、机制设计，产业组织、博弈论
ResearchArea:
Microeconomics, Mechanism Design,Industrial Organization, Game Theory
Abstract:
Thispaper studies the role of cross-market information spillovers in a multi-gooddynamic bargaining problem with interdependent values. More precisely, in anenvironment where a seller has two heterogeneous goods for sale in two marketsand is better informed than the potential buyers about the qualities of thegoods, we investigate how the information revealed through (non-)trade of onegood affects the probability of trade of the other good, and its consequencesto the trading dynamics and patterns of specialization. Our main finding isthat when the qualities of the two goods are sufficiently negatively correlatedand the seller is patient, then even if adverse selection precludes first-bestefficiency for both goods, it is mitigated as sequential trade occurs quicklythrough the seller's endogenous signaling motive, as long as buyers in onemarket observe the (non-)trading outcome in the other market. As a consequence,sellers have an incentive to specialize in one of the two goods before playingthe bargaining game with the buyers, in such a way to endogenously generate therequired negative correlation between the qualities of the two goods. Incontrast, without such cross-market observability and subsequentspecialization, i.e., endogenous negative correlation, there is eitherbargaining delay or impasse in both markets as in the standard dynamic adverseselection problem.
